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Title:Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Authors:ID Zhang, Yuji (Author)
ID Feng, Minyu (Author)
ID Li, Qin (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
Files:.pdf RAZ_Zhang_Yuji_2026.pdf (2,10 MB)
MD5: 4345022ACCBEB67CC187721DB84FC280
 
URL https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4
 
Language:English
Work type:Unknown
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma.
Keywords:cooperation, evolutionary game theory, stochastic processes, complex networks, social physics
Publication version:Version of Record
Article acceptance date:29.01.2026
Publication date:19.03.2026
Publisher:Springer Nature
Year of publishing:2026
Number of pages:11 str.
Numbering:Letn. 9, št. članka 101
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-97653 New window
UDC:530:519.83
ISSN on article:2399-3650
COBISS.SI-ID:273482243 New window
DOI:10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4 New window
Publication date in DKUM:30.03.2026
Views:226
Downloads:2
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Communications physics
Shortened title:Commun. phys.
Publisher:Springer Nature
ISSN:2399-3650
COBISS.SI-ID:2048602387 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
Project number:P1-0403-2019
Name:Računsko intenzivni kompleksni sistemi

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:19.03.2026

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:sodelovanje, evolucijska teorija iger, stohastični procesi, kompleksna omrežja, fizika družbe


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