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Title:Fenomenologija zavesti (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty in sodobne nevroznanosti)
Authors:ID Somer, Rika Adela (Author)
Files:.pdf RAZ_Somer_Rika_Adela_2025.pdf (375,39 KB)
MD5: 1355F9B61C0CBD4397DA3201A3216795
 
URL https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/en/article/view/5859/3542
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.02 - Review Article
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
UZUM - University of Maribor Press
Abstract:Zavest je eno najbolj skrivnostnih in hkrati temeljnih področij filozofije duha. Čeprav sodobne nevroznanosti ponujajo zmeraj natančnejše opise možganskih procesov, ostaja vprašanje, kako ti procesi ustvarjajo subjektivno izkustvo – občutja, barve, bolečino – odprto. V članku se posvečam fenomenološkemu pristopu, ki ga je zasnoval Edmund Husserl in ga je pozneje razvil Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Fenomenologija zavesti ne obravnava kot zaprt notranji proces, temveč kot intencionalno usmerjenost k svetu, kjer pomen nastaja v sami izkušnji. Poseben poudarek je namenjen tudi Merleu- Pontyjevemu razumevanju telesa kot »živega telesa«, ki je pogoj zaznavanja in naše umeščenosti v svet. V nadaljevanju obravnavam problem takšnosti – vprašanje, kako subjektivna doživetja presegajo objektivne opise – in pokažem, da fenomenološki pristop odpira prostor za dialog s sodobnimi teorijami, kot so utelešena kognicija, enaktivizem in nevroznanost. Članek pokaže, da fenomenologija ne ponuja dokončnega odgovora na vprašanje zavesti, ampak jo lahko razumemo kot dopolnilo sodobnim znanostim, ki omogoča celovitejši vpogled v naravo zavesti.
Keywords:zavest, intencionalnost, telesnost, nevroznanost
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Article acceptance date:02.09.2025
Publication date:31.12.2025
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
Year of publishing:2025
Number of pages:str. 223-245
Numbering:Letn. 29, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-97688 New window
UDC:165.62
ISSN on article:1408-2969
COBISS.SI-ID:273518595 New window
DOI:10.18690/analiza.29.2.223-246.2025 New window
Publication date in DKUM:03.04.2026
Views:158
Downloads:2
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Analiza : časopis za kritično misel
Shortened title:Analiza
Publisher:Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
ISSN:1408-2969
COBISS.SI-ID:67716608 New window

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:31.12.2025

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Phenomenology of consciousness (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and contemporary neuroscience)
Abstract:Consciousness is one of the most mysterious yet fundamental topics in the philosophy of mind. Although contemporary neuroscience offers increasingly precise descriptions of brain processes, the question of how these processes give rise to subjective experience–feelings, colours, pain–remains unresolved. This paper focuses on the phenomenological approach developed by Edmund Husserl and later expanded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology does not treat consciousness as an enclosed internal process but rather as intentional directedness toward the world, where meaning emerges within experience itself. Special emphasis is placed on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body as a “lived body,” which constitutes the condition of perception and our embeddedness in the world. The paper further examines the problem of qualia–the question of how subjective experiences transcend objective descriptions–and demonstrates that the phenomenological approach opens a space for dialogue with contemporary theories such as embodied cognition, enactivism, and neuroscience. The article shows that phenomenology does not provide a definitive answer to the question of consciousness, but it can be understood as a complement to modern sciences, offering a more comprehensive insight into the nature of consciousness.
Keywords:consciousness, pornographyintentionality, embodiment, neuroscience


Collection

This document is a part of these collections:
  1. Analiza

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