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Title:PROBLEM VIDEZA KONTINGENCE V FILOZOFIJI DUHA
Authors:ID Lipuš, Alen (Author)
ID Bregant, Janez (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf UN_Lipus_Alen_2015.pdf (642,84 KB)
MD5: FA3D4803F01B0E384B3B35510F49DDD0
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Undergraduate thesis
Typology:2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:V diplomski nalogi se ukvarjamo z vprašanjem videza kontingence v primeru aposteriorne identitete duha in telesa. Videz kontingence je prisoten pri propozicijah, ki so aposteriorne identitete. Večina tovrstnih identitet ni spornih, ker lahko brezhibno pojasnimo videz kontingence. Slednja je prisotna, kadar en člen v identiteti referira kontingentno. Pri identiteti mentalnega in fizičnega kontingentno referiranje ne nastopa in je torej videz kontingence težje razložljiv. Dozdevanje kontingentnosti v diplomski nalogi obravnavamo tako, da najprej raziščemo strategijo pojavnih pojmov kot kandidata za razlago. Slednja se izkaže za nevzdržno stališče, ker preozko razume pojavne pojme in predpostavlja to, kar je šele potrebno dokazati. Nadalje se osredotočimo na razlikovanje med teoretičnim in intuitivnim dojetjem nečesa in to podkrepimo z obravnavo Papineaujevega razumevanja Kripkejevega argumenta iz zamisljivosti. Iz te obravnave vidimo, kako se Kripkejev argument razlikuje od dvo-dimenzionalnega (2D) argumenta, ki v sodobni filozofiji velja za verodostojno revizijo Kripkejevega argumenta. Na podlagi tega lahko odgovorimo na izvorni Kripkejev izziv, in sicer tako, da videz kontingence razložimo kot posledico intuicije različnosti. Prikažemo, da je slednja osnovana na miselni zmoti in to razširimo na problem duha in telesa, za katerega tako potem velja, da nima ontološke podlage.
Keywords:Problem duha in telesa, identiteta duha in telesa, videz kontingence, argument iz zamisljivosti, Kripke, dvodimenzionalen (2D) argument.
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:[A. Lipuš]
Year of publishing:2015
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-48552 New window
UDC:13(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:21533448 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:XLLJRKYG
Publication date in DKUM:13.10.2015
Views:1680
Downloads:118
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:FF
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:PROBLEM OF THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Abstract:We will discuss the problem of the appearance of contingency in the case of aposteriory identity of mind and body. The appearence of contingency is present in propositions that are aposteriory identities. Most such propositions are not problematic because we can explain the appearance of contingency, which is present whenever one of the elements in the identity statement refers contingently. In the case of identity of mental and physical, there is no contingent referring and thus the appearance of contingency is harder to explain. We explore the appearance of contingency with the help of phenomenal concepts strategy as one candidate for explanation. We conclude that this strategy is of no use because it employs a very limited and narrow meaning of phenomenal concepts, and it can also be seen as circular. Instead, we examine another strategy that requires discrimination between theoretical and intuitive understanding. This leads to Papineau's version of Kripke's concievability argument, from which we can see how a modern, Two-dimensional (2D) version of Kripke's argument differs from the original argument. We can now answer Kripke's challenge: the appearance of contingency is a consequence of the intuition of distinctiveness. This intuition is founded upon a fallacy, and we can expand this logic to the broader mind-body problem, from which we conclude that the problem has no ontological basis
Keywords:Mind-body problem, mind-body identity, the appearence of contingency, concievability argument, Kripke, two-dimensional (2D) argument.


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