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Title:Zakaj se pri predračunavanju ne lažemo?
Authors:ID Kokol, Anže (Author)
ID Kolar, Iztok (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf UN_Kokol_Anze_2019.pdf (698,53 KB)
MD5: EE5B443DC653EF37D79C71EB3C8A6023
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/23aedea2-5204-44c6-a15d-127b2fd2a6cd
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Diploma project paper
Typology:2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:Računovodsko predračunavanje je eden izmed najmočnejših inštrumentov menedžmenta pri nadziranju poslovanja podjetja, vendar ga zaposleni, ki predračune pripravljajo, lahko izigravajo. To seveda povečuje možnost namernih napak in omejuje učinkovitost uporabe predračunov za nadzor. Vendar raziskave na tem področju kažejo, da je izigravanje pri pripravi predračunov omejeno z dovzetnostjo zaposlenih za socialne norme. Poznavanje takšnega pojava bi lahko pomagalo menedžerjem pri nadzoru procesa predračunavanja. Sedanji pristopi nadzora so namreč pogosto togi in velikokrat omejujejo uporabnost predračunov, s tem pa tudi zmanjšujejo uspešnost poslovanja podjetja. Nov pristop s pomočjo merjenja in poznavanja psihološkega profila zaposlenih bi menedžerjem omogočil lažje določanje potrebnih kontrol, kar bi lahko povečalo uspešnost podjetja. Diplomsko delo v veliki meri temelji na raziskavi, objavljeni v reviji Management accounting reserch, z naslovom Why don't people lie? Negative affect intensity and preferences for honesty. V raziskavi avtorji Bay, A., Douthit, J., in Fulmer, B., ta pojav poimenujejo dovzetnost za resnico.
Keywords:Računovodsko predračunavanje, resnica, socialne norme.
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:[A. Kokol]
Year of publishing:2019
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-73986 New window
UDC:657.3
COBISS.SI-ID:13478428 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:KYE8UY67
Publication date in DKUM:06.12.2019
Views:1015
Downloads:101
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:EPF
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Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:13.07.2019

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Why people don't lie in budgetary reporting?
Abstract:Budgets are strong instruments in the management control system but they are prone to gaming behavior. This, in turn, creates slack and limits the effectiveness of budgets. Research suggests, however, that subordinates have preferences for adhering to a social norm of honesty that limits slack in their budgetary reporting. Understanding such a phenomenon could help managers with better control over the budgetary process. Present control systems are often too strict, which limits the usability of budgets. This, in turn, limits the success of the company. A new approach with knowledge of the psychological profile of employes would enable managers to determine the level of control over budgetary reporting. This dissertation is based on a research paper published in the journal Management accounting research, with the title »Why don't people lie? Negative affect intensity and preferences for honesty«.
Keywords:Budgetary reporting, honesty, social norms.


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