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Title:Trdi inkompatibilizem, svoboda in moralna odgovornost
Authors:ID Koprivnik, Tim (Author)
ID Šuster, Danilo (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf MAG_Koprivnik_Tim_2019.pdf (533,50 KB)
MD5: 2D13FE127764D38511A5F0E21D793CF3
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/70d85290-2f86-4a28-9d23-d742bfe6e04b
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Typology:2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:Cilja magistrske naloge sta predvsem dva: prvič, dokazati pravilnost stališča trdega inkompatibilizma in, drugič, ga braniti pred glavnimi očitki/ugovori. Prvi cilj se poskuša doseči tako, da se (predvsem) preko Pereboomovega argumenta iz štirih primerov pokaže, da sta obe nasprotni stališči v filozofiji svobode, ki zagovarjata obstoj svobode in moralne odgovornosti v klasičnem smislu (kompatibilizem in libertarizem), neprepričljivi in izredno problematični. Kar se pa tiče drugega cilja, pa se poskuša pokazati, da so vsi ti očitki/ugovori trdemu inkompatibilizmu, ki izpostavljajo predvsem to, kakšne grozne praktične posledice naj bi sledile za naša življenja, v kolikor sprejmemo njegovo resničnost (med drugim bi naj izgubili kakršnokoli moralno odgovornost), nekorektni in da torej resničnost trdega inkompatibilizma ne prinaša prav nobene bojazni.
Keywords:svoboda, moralna odgovornost, determinizem, argument iz štirih primerov, trdi inkompatibilizem
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:[T. Koprivnik]
Year of publishing:2019
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-74788 New window
UDC:17:123(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:24810760 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:TVJJKAO9
Publication date in DKUM:28.10.2019
Views:1680
Downloads:200
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:FF
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Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:06.09.2019

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Hard incompatibilism, free will and moral responsibility
Abstract:The objectives of the Master's thesis are mainly two: firstly, to demonstrate the correctness of the position of hard incompatibilism and, secondly, to defend it against major objections. The first objective is achieved by showing (in particular) through the Pereboom’s four-case argument that the two main opposite positions in the philosophy of free will, which advocate the existence of free will and moral responsibility in the classical sense (compatibilism and libertarianism), are unconvincing and highly problematic. As for the second goal, it’s shown that all these allegations/objections against hard incompatibilism that stress out all the horrible practical consequences for our lives (among other things, loss of any kind of moral responsibility), insofar as we accept its reality, are incorrect, and that therefore our lives can remain mostly the same.
Keywords:free will, moral responsibility, determinism, four-case argument, hard incompatibilism


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