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Title:Vpliv izbire postopkov in instrumentov javnega naročanja na smotrnost porabe javnih sredstev
Authors:ID Matas, Sašo (Author)
ID Oplotnik, Žan Jan (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf DOK_Matas_Saso_2025.pdf (5,07 MB)
MD5: 816AA90D687EA61C4499BF8A20E940AF
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Doctoral dissertation
Typology:2.08 - Doctoral Dissertation
Organization:EPF - Faculty of Business and Economics
Abstract:V doktorski disertaciji proučujemo vpliv postopkov in instrumentov javnega naročanja na smotrno porabo javnih sredstev, katere pomemben element je alokacijska učinkovitost. Razumevanje učinkovitosti sistema javnega naročanja, ki temelji na evropskih pravilih javnega naročanja, je vse bolj pomembno, saj javno naročanje predstavlja vse večji del javne potrošnje. Učinkovito javno naročanje kot vzvod smotrne porabe javnih sredstev lahko dosega precejšnje prihranke, pri čemer učinkovitost razumemo kot boljše doseganje vrednosti za denar. Povezava med slabimi praksami javnega naročanja in ekonomsko rastjo je nedvoumna, zato morajo reforme javnega naročanja, ki želijo povečati rast, temeljito razumeti kompleksnost narave sistema javnega naročanja ter hkrati nasloviti vrsto izzivov na področju odgovornosti, transparentnosti, poštenosti in ekonomske učinkovitosti. Temeljni cilj doktorske disertacije je izvesti neposredno primerjavo različnih postopkov javnega naročanja, tehnik javnega naročanja in sekundarnih politik ter analizirati njihov vpliv na smotrnost porabe javnih sredstev z vidika teorije učinkovitosti izmenjevalnih mehanizmov. V prvi fazi teoretičnega dela smo predstavili teorijo funkcije javnih financ, predvsem alokacijsko funkcijo kot eno izmed treh funkcij, in ugotavljali elemente smotrne porabe javnih sredstev v luči smotrnosti poslovanja, kot jih pojasnjujejo standardi mednarodnega revidiranja. Ugotovili smo, da učinkovito upravljanje z javnimi financami temelji na fiskalni disciplini in alokacijski učinkovitosti. Smotrnost poslovanja oblikujejo načela gospodarnosti, učinkovitosti in uspešnosti, kjer načelo učinkovitosti pomeni pridobiti največ iz razpoložljivih sredstev. Pri proučevanju sistema javnega naročanja smo pojasnili ekonomske razloge urejanja tega sistema in pregledali literaturo s področja učinkovitosti javnega naročanja, ki poskuša pojasniti nekatere dejavnike, ki lahko vplivajo na njegovo učinkovitost, te dejavnike pa primarno ureja skupni evropski pravni okvir javnega naročanja. V drugem delu teoretičnega dela pa smo predstavili spoznanja teorije dražb. Naša raziskava proučuje vse izvedene postopke v obdobju od leta 2016 do 2023 in je neslučajnostne narave, saj so bili izbrani vsi postopki v tem obdobju, proučevali pa smo več kot 15 različnih dejavnikov. Na podlagi raziskave smo ugotovili statistično značilne različne učinke vključenih dejavnikov, ki pojasnjujejo, da je mogoče z različno kombinacijo (vključenih dejavnikov), spodbudami in omejevanjem uporabe različnih dejavnikov vzpostaviti učinkovit sistem javnega naročanja. Vzpostaviti ga je mogoče na podlagi normativnega okvira, da omogoča smotrno porabo javnih sredstev. V svoji raziskavi smo ugotovili, da razlika med postopki glede na učinke in posledično na smotrno porabo javnih financ obstaja. Ugotovili smo, da sta najučinkovitejša postopka odprti postopek in postopek naročila male vrednosti, v teh postopkih pa je prisotna tudi največja konkurenčnost. Na drugi strani pa so najmanj učinkoviti netransparentni oziroma omejujoči postopki (v smislu proste dostopnosti), na primer postopek s pogajanji brez predhodne objave, ki ima tudi najnižje število ponudb. Med učinkovitostjo transparentnih in netransparentnih postopkov obstaja znatna razlika. V raziskavi smo preverjali tudi statistično pomembne razlike med tremi tehnikami oziroma instrumenti, ki se uporabljajo v javnem naročanju, torej med elektronsko obratno dražbo, skupnim javnim naročanjem in okvirnim sporazumom ter kombinacijo med njimi. Ugotovili smo, zopet s preverjanjem statistično pomembnih razlik med njimi pri razliki ocenjene in pogodbene vrednosti, da je najučinkovitejši instrument, ki uporablja mehanizem skupnega javnega naročanja, bodisi samostojno naročilo ali v kombinaciji z elektronsko dražbo (in tudi okvirnim sporazumom). Na drugi strani pa je najmanj učinkovit instrument okvirnega sporazuma. Na koncu naloge podamo predloge za izboljšanje regulatornega okvira sistema javnega naročanja.
Keywords:javno naročanje, smotrna poraba javnih sredstev, učinkovit sistem javnega naročanja, teorija dražb, Evropska unija, Slovenija.
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:S. Matas]
Year of publishing:2025
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-92336 New window
UDC:351.712:336.1(043.3)
COBISS.SI-ID:259742979 New window
Publication date in DKUM:03.12.2025
Views:234
Downloads:79
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:EPF
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Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:31.03.2025

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:The impact of choosing public procurement procedures and instruments on efficient and effective spending of public funds
Abstract:This doctoral thesis examines the impact of public procurement procedures and instruments on the efficient use of public funds, an important element of which is allocative efficiency. It is becoming increasingly important to understand the efficiency of a public procurement system based on European public procurement rules, as public procurement represents a growing part of public consumption. In some EU Member States, Efficient public procurement, as a lever for the efficient use of public funds, can achieve significant savings, where efficiency is understood as simply achieving better value for money. The link between poor public procurement practices and economic growth is unambiguous, and public procurement reforms that aim to boost growth need to thoroughly understand the complex nature of the public procurement system, as well as address a range of challenges in the areas of accountability, transparency, fairness and value for money. The main objective of doctoral thesis is to make a direct comparison between different public procurement procedures, procurement techniques and secondary policies and to analyse their impact on the efficiency of public spending from the perspective of the theory of the efficiency of exchange mechanisms. Since Member States are not allowed to change their public procurement rules substantially when they are derived from the single text of the directives, the analysis will also try to give an answer on the efficiency of the European public procurement system. In the first phase of the theoretical work, we introduced the theory of the public finance function, in particular the allocation function, as one of the three functions, and identified the elements of efficient use of public funds in the light of value for money as explained by international auditing standards. In the second part of our theoretical work, we present the insights of auction theory, explaining the relevance of the principle of disclosure and the revenue equivalence theorem. We have argued in this section that, in order to pursue greater economic efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, based on an understanding of the public procurement market as a non-functioning market, the State (broadly speaking) has established a public procurement system based on coercive regulations governing this system. The theoretical background provided the foundation for the development of the model, which was utilised for the analysis of efficiency elements. The present study examines all the procedures and is non-randomised, as all procedures carried out during this period were selected and more than 15 different factors were examined. The survey revealed statistically significant differential effects of the factors involved. It was established that different combinations (of the factors involved), incentives and constraints can be used to create an efficient public procurement system. In our study, we found that there is a difference between the procedures in terms of impact and, consequently, in terms of value for money. We found that the most efficient procedures are the open procedure and the small value procurement procedure, and that these procedures are also the most competitive. On the other hand, non-transparent or restrictive procedures (in terms of free accessibility), such as the negotiated procedure without prior publication, which also has the lowest number of tenders, are the least efficient. We also found, again by testing for statistically significant differences between them in the difference between the estimated and the contract value, that the most efficient instrument is the one using the joint procurement mechanism. On the other hand, the least efficient instrument is the framework agreement. At the end of the thesis, we make proposals to improve the regulatory framework of public procurement.
Keywords:public procurement, effective spenditure of public funds, efficient system of public procurement, theory of auctions, European Union, Slovenia.


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