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Title:Higher-order evidence in science : some problematic consequences of steadfastness and level-splitting
Authors:ID Justin, Martin (Author)
Files:.pdf RAZ_Justin_Martin_2024.pdf (484,68 KB)
MD5: 8A52DB4D6F517AC83DF31DCFB5F9A4E0
 
URL https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/4941/3237
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
UZUM - University of Maribor Press
Abstract:Despite our best efforts, we often fail to act in a perfectly rational manner. Recently, some epistemologists have suggested that we should admit our failings and develop a modest epistemology that would take our fallibility seriously. This includes accounting for the role of evidence of our irrationality, usually called higher-order evidence. It seems intuitive that modest reasoners should take such evidence into account. However, it turns out that incorporating higher-order evidence into a principled theory of what rationality requires is not an easy task. In this paper, I first review the debate about higher-order evidence, describing in detail the puzzle of higher-order evidence and the main positions about it in the literature. Then, I provide two novel examples of higher-order evidence, taken from science. I argue that these examples put pressure on the views that reject the role of higher-order evidence. These views commit themselves to the conclusion that some common scientific practices, such as evaluating evidence in systematic reviews or even running null hypothesis significance tests, are irrational.
Keywords:higher-order evidence, epistemology, rationality, science
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Submitted for review:01.10.2024
Article acceptance date:30.11.2024
Publication date:31.12.2024
Year of publishing:2024
Number of pages:str. 241-262
Numbering:Letn. 28, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-94629 New window
UDC:165
ISSN on article:2712-4916
COBISS.SI-ID:246331651 New window
DOI:10.18690/analiza.28.2.241-262.2024 New window
Publication date in DKUM:25.08.2025
Views:202
Downloads:8
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Analiza : časopis za kritično misel
Shortened title:Analiza
Publisher:Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti, Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
ISSN:1408-2969
COBISS.SI-ID:67716608 New window

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:31.12.2024

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Title:Dokazi višjega reda v znanosti : nekaj problematičnih posledicodločnostiin razdruževanja ravni
Abstract:Kljub prizadevanju po nasprotnem pogosto ravnamo iracionalno. V zadnjem času so nekateri epistemologi predlagali, da priznamo svoje napake in poskušali razviti skromno epistemologijo, ki bo v zakup vzela dejstva o naši iracionalnosti. Pomemben del takšne epistemologije predstavlja tudi opis vloge dokazil o naši iracionalnosti, t. i. dokazil višjega reda. Intuitivno se zdi, da bi morali pri tvorjenju prepričanj takšna dokazila upoštevati. Vendar pa se izkaže, da vključevanje dokazil višjega reda v teorijo racionalnosti ni lahka naloga. Vtem prispevku najprej pregledam razpravo o dokazilih višjega reda, podrobno opišem problem dokazil višjega reda in predstavim glavne odgovore nanj. Nato predstavim dva nova primera dokazil višjega reda, vzeta iz znanosti. Trdim, da ta primera pod vprašaj postavljata stališča, ki zavračajo vlogo dokazov višjega reda. Ta stališča implicirajo, da so nekatere vsakdanje znanstvene prakse, kot sta vrednotenje dokazil v sistematičnih preglednih člankih ali celo izvajanje testov statistične značilnosti, iracionalne.
Keywords:epistemologija, dokazila višjega reda, racionalnost, znanost


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  1. Analiza

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