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Title:What One Can Know : Fitch’s Argument and Its Consequences
Authors:ID Smokrović, Nenad (Author)
Files:.pdf What_One_Can_Know.pdf (534,28 KB)
MD5: F0EC25C8D818A3407C5FF20A9330ECFC
 
URL https://journals.um.si/index.php/analiza/article/view/4939
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
UZUM - University of Maribor Press
Abstract:The paper, motivated by the chapter in Šuster’s book, considers the aspect of the so-called Fitch’s ar-gument (FA) that seriously challenges the verificationist theory. Contrary to Šuster’s view, it is throughout the paper that I’m pursuing the idea that most of the attempts that intend to vindicate verifi-cationism from the grip of Fitch’s argument, including Edgington’s theory, fail in their intention. Con-cerning the attempts to mitigate the effect of Fitch’s argument to verificationism in the framework of classical logic (Eddington as the most important representative), I’m siding with their critics (William-son, Percival) and claim that they fail in their intention. Regarding the attempts to block the effect of Fitch’s argument in the framework of non-classical (intuitionistic, relevant, dialetheist, and so on) log-ic, they do it by introducing principles that invalidate some of the basic classical rules and principles, usually introducing trivial worlds. In that case, the verificationist principle (as well as all inferences included in Fitch’s argument) is vacuously valid, which seems to be unsatisfactory. In any case, there is no decisive evidence that either classical or any of the non-classical approaches can avail the verifi-cationist anything to escape out of the grip of FA.
Keywords:verificationism, anti-realism, Fitch’s paradox, classical logic, non-classical logic
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Publication date:31.12.2024
Place of publishing:Maribor
Publisher:Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba
Year of publishing:2024
Number of pages:20
Numbering:Letn. 28, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-97150 New window
ISSN on article:2712-4916
DOI:10.18690/analiza.28.2.209-228.2024 New window
Publication date in DKUM:20.02.2026
Views:130
Downloads:7
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Title:Kaj lahko vemo : Fitchev argument in njegove posledice
Abstract:Članek, ki je motiviran na osnovi poglavja v Šusterjevi knjigi, obravnava vidik tako imenovanega Fitchevega argumenta (FA), ki predstavlja resen izziv za veri-fikacijsko teorijo. V nasprotju s Šusterjevim stališčem v celotnem prispevku za-sledujem stališče, da večina poskusov, ki nameravajo verifikacionizem ubraniti izpod primeža Fitchevega argumenta, vključno z Edgingtonovo teorijo, ne uspe. Kar zadeva poskuse omilitve posledic Fitchovega argumenta za verifikacionizem v okviru klasične logike (Eddington kot najpomembnejši predstavnik), se postav-ljam na stran njihovih kritikov (Williamson, Percival) in trdim, da jim njihova namera ni uspela. Kar zadeva poskuse blokiranja vpliva Fitchevega argumenta v okviru neklasičnih (intuicionističnih, relevantnih, dialetheističnih in tako naprej) logik, to počnejo z uvajanjem načel, ki razveljavljajo nekatera osnovna klasična pravila in principe, pri čemer običajno uvajajo trivialne svetove. V tem primeru je verifikacionistično načelo (kot tudi vsi sklepi, vključeni v Fitchev argument) prazno resnično, kar ni zadovoljivo. V vsakem primeru pa ni prepričljivih doka-zov, da bi bodisi klasični bodisi kateri koli od neklasičnih pristopov verifikacio-nistu lahko pomagal, da bi se rešil iz primeža FA.
Keywords:verifikacionizem, antirealizem, Fitchev paradoks, klasična logika, neklasična logika


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  1. Analiza

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