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Title:Zakoni in protidejstveniki ali filozofija in problem "copyrighta"
Authors:ID Šuster, Danilo (Author)
Files:.pdf Casopis_za_kritiko_znanosti_1997_Suster_Zakoni_in_protidejstveniki_ali_filozofija_in_problem_copyrighta.pdf (85,35 KB)
MD5: 0FE0FC92E8DB175E4D740B49FDAED535
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/05e571fa-9b8d-4ce6-9321-377e0270be67
 
URL http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-XY5PTST0
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:PEF - Faculty of Education
Abstract:Razprava obravnava Popperjevo pojasnilo odnosa med zakoni narave in protidejstvenimi pogojniki. Kadar je neka resnična univerzalna posplošitev, pravi zakon narave, tedaj podpira ustrezni protidejstvenik, kadar ni, takrat je protidejstvenik napačen. Ker zakon narave in univerzalna posplošitev nimata enakih logičnih posledic, nimata enake logične moči, pravi argument iz "razlike v podpori". Po kriteriju falsifikacionizma so zakoni narave ovrgljivi. Če je zakon ovrgljiv, potem ne more biti nujen. In če zakon ni nujen, potem ne more podpirati protidejstvenikov. Popper je zato skušal ovreči argument iz razlike v podpori in zakone narave vseeno izraziti kot univerzalne posplošitve. Razlika v podpori zanj izvira iz različne strukture terminov, ki nastopajo v posplošitvi. Izrazi v slučajnih posplošitvah so definirani ekstenzionalno, izrazi v zakonih narave so kvalitativni, oznake za intenzije. S tem je Popper napovedal sodobno teorijo, po kateri je zakon narave zveza intenzij, razumljenih kot univerzalije. Vendar zaradi vztrajanja pri logični obliki univerzalne posplošitve, ki da jo imajo zakoni narave, Popper do prave rešitve nikoli ni prišel.
Keywords:filozofija, filozofija znanosti, znanosti, teorije znanosti
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:1997
Number of pages:str. 191
Numbering:Letn. 25, št. 186-187
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-67086 New window
ISSN:0351-4285
UDC:11:001
ISSN on article:0351-4285
COBISS.SI-ID:6925576 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:QTUWFG7G
Publication date in DKUM:02.08.2017
Views:1305
Downloads:103
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Časopis za kritiko znanosti
Shortened title:Čas. krit. znan.
Publisher:Študentska organizacija Univerze v Ljubljani
ISSN:0351-4285
COBISS.SI-ID:672783 New window

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:02.08.2017

Secondary language

Language:English
Abstract:The article discusses Popper's explanation of the relationship between the laws of nature and counterfactuals. When a certain universal generalisation isa true natural law, it supports a suitable counterfactual, and when it is not a natural law, the counterfactual is incorrect. According to the "from difference to support" argument, since a natural law and a universal generalisation do not have the same logical consequences, they are not of equal logical strength. According to the criterion of falsificationism, the laws of nature are refutable. If a law is refutable, it is not mandatory. And if a law is not mandatory, it cannot support counterfactuals. For this reason,Popper attempted to refute the "from difference to support" argument and still formulate natural laws as universal generalisations. He maintains that "from difference to support" is derived from different terminological structures featured in generalisation. Terminology in random generalisations is defined extensively, whilst terminology in natural laws is qualitative and denotes intentions. Popper thus precedes modern theory, according to which a natural law is a structure of intentions understood as being universal. However, because of his insistence on the logical form of universal generalisation as being characteristic of natural laws, Popper never found the proper solution to the problem.
Keywords:philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences, science theories


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